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The research reported here provides further empirical support for the contention that there 
is a divergence between WTA and WTP. The conclusion is based on results from a 2002 
survey of Nevada ranchers that asked about willingness to pay for public forage and 
WTA compensation to part with grazing rights. WTP and WTA are estimated 
simultaneously, with the estimators used to demonstrate a statistically significant 
divergence between WTP and WTA. The simultaneous estimation allows us to identify 
ranch characteristics that influence the discrepancy in valuations. Ranch size, public 
grazing allotment, financial distress, and long term commitment to ranching are all 
significant influences on the disparity. We interpret these results both with respect to 
general differences in welfare measures and with respect to ranch policy. 
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 1. Introduction
When people are asked to value changes in the availability of a public or environmental
good, willingness to accept compensation (hereafter WTA) generally exceeds willingness
to pay (WTP), often by a substantial amount. Hanemann [11], building on earlier work
by Randall and Stoll [21], demonstrates that divergence between WTA and WTP is to be
expected for many environmental goods. Speciﬁcally, public goods that have few if any
private goods that are ready substitutes, which may often be the case for environmental
goods, are likely to have WTA valuations in excess of WTP valuations.1
Alternatively, evidence from contingent valuation surveys and experimental markets sug-
gests that individuals become attached to a particular endowment, requiring a higher level
of compensation to part with something than they would pay to obtain it (Knetsch [14]).
The problem is not on the supply side (availability of substitutes), but lies with preferences.
Indiﬀerence curves are somehow kinked (and not continuously diﬀerentiable) at the endow-
ment. Thus, the observed diﬀerence between WTP and WTA remains, even for market
goods where there are adequate substitutes, such as mugs and candy bars.2
Whatever the explanation, the disparity between the two valuation measures is well
established theoretically and empirically, with the empirical evidence nicely summarized in
Horowitz and McConnell [12]. The objective of this paper is to examine this disparity in
1Divergence in the welfare measures is also positively related to the income elasticity of demand for the
good in question, though Hanemann argues the substitution eﬀects are likely to be more important. More
generally, the income eﬀect is usually regarded to be insuﬃcient to explain the observed divergences in
valuations; see Hanemann [11] and references cited therein.
2Empirical support for the endowment eﬀect is presented in Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [13] and
Knetsch, Tang and Thaler [15]. Shogren et al. [22] and List [16], [17] present evidence against the endowment
eﬀect; Shogren et al. use experimental data to demonstrate that, for goods for which substitutes are plentiful,
WTP and WTA converge with repeated market participation, but for goods with few substitutes (such as
food purchases where health risks are involved) repeated participation did not result in convergence; List
ﬁnds that the endowment eﬀect is prevalent among inexperienced traders, but not among experienced ones
(in his case, trading sport memorabilia). Whether these results convincingly refute endowment eﬀects is the
matter of some debate; see Knetsch, Tang and Thaler [15] and Donkers, Gregory and Knetsch [6].
1further detail in the context of a recent survey of Nevada ranchers that concerned access
to grazing on public lands. The survey elicits both a willingness to pay and a willingness
to accept valuation for public forage; in addition it provides a rich set of information about
ranch characteristics. The dual nature of the survey, both WTP and WTA, and the extensive
information set on ranch characteristics allows us to examine the disparity between welfare
measures in a systematic manner. We use a bivariate dichotomous choice framework to
model the willingness to pay and accept decisions simultaneously, similar to Poe, Welsh and
Champ [20]. This framework allows us to test directly the diﬀerence in welfare measures.
It also allows us to examine which of the ranch characteristics contribute to the observed
diﬀerences in welfare measures, providing some information about the importance of close
substitutes and endowment eﬀects. To our knowledge, this has not been done previously
and is the principal contribution of the paper.
To foreshadow our principal results, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant disparity between willingness
to accept and willingness to pay valuations. The discrepancy between valuations is similar
to previous studies, with WTA ranging from 2–12 times as large as WTP. We ﬁnd a number
of ranch characteristics associated with this discrepancy: (1) the size of the ranch, which we
conjecture may relate to available substitutes for public grazing; (2) the size of allocation
of public grazing, which is surprisingly inversely related to the discrepancy in valuations;
(3) ﬁnancial distress; and (4) long term commitment to ranching, either as an occupation or
lifestyle. Each of these results bears on public grazing policy, providing insights into ranchers’
valuations, as well as some information about the relative importance of substitution eﬀects
and endowment eﬀects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a
brief background to the issue of livestock grazing on public lands, and we provide a brief
description of the 2002 Nevada Ranch Survey. The theoretical model is provided in section
23, while the WTA and WTP estimation results are provided in section 4. We conclude in
section 5 with a discussion of policy implications and considerations for further research.
2. Grazing on Public Range and the Nevada Ranch Survey
Although open access grazing ended on some public lands around 1900, it was not until the
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 that it was halted on all public lands in the United States. Over
the three decades that followed, administration of grazing on public lands evolved into a sys-
tem characterized by grazing districts and allotments, limits on herd size (eﬀectively limiting
the size of ranches), and fees for public forage using the animal unit month (AUM) measure.3
While grazing fees diﬀered on U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
lands until 1981, the 1978 Public Rangelands Improvement Act established that all grazing
fees would be calculated as a base fee of $1.23 per AUM (established in 1966 using a cost
of production approach) that was adjusted using indexes of private grazing values, livestock
market prices and rancher operating costs, but with the proviso that the fee not decline
below $1.35 per AUM.4
The grazing fee reached a high of $2.36 per AUM in 1980 falling to $1.35 in 1985, never
again to exceed $2 per AUM; the grazing fee was $1.43 in 2002, falling back to $1.35 in
2003 where it had been for most of the previous decade. This despite the fact that cattle
have generally increased in size and private alternatives for grazing averaged $11 per AUM
in 1997 (Dietz and Rothenberg [5]). In Oregon, private grazing was valued at an average
of $9.23 per AUM in 2004, and an average $8.83 per AUM in the two most southeasterly
counties in the State, Malheur ($2.53 per AUM) and Harney ($12.43 per AUM) counties,
3An AUM is the amount of forage needed to support one cow and calf, one horse or ﬁve sheep for a period
of one month.
4See Torell et al. [24] and Dietz and Rothenberg [5].
3which border Nevada.5 In 2003, while the BLM grazing fee was set at $1.35, the respective
fees charged on state-owned lands in Oregon, Idaho and Washington were $4.16, $5.33 and
$7.52 per AUM.6
Although rates of return to livestock production average no more than 2 percent while the
return to private grazing lands is estimated to average 3.4 percent (Bartlett et al. [1]), grazing
permits that give ranchers perpetual rights to graze cattle on public land have positive value.7
In theory, the value of a grazing permit is equal to the diﬀerence between the marginal value
of public forage minus the grazing fee appropriately discounted, where the discount rate
takes into account the possibility of losing the right to graze livestock at some future time
(Gardner [7], [8]). Grazing permits are generally not traded, although they do get capitalized
in ranch values, so it is diﬃcult to determine their true value. However, research by Borges
and Knetsch [2] does suggest one reason why little trading of grazing permits occurs, namely,
that those holding permits value them more highly than those wanting to buy them.
Range economists argue that private and public grazing values are not directly compa-
rable, because operating costs are higher on public lands and private landowners provide
services (not available from federal land agencies) that account for at least 30 percent of
private value (Bartlett et al. p.429 [1]; Gardner, p.53 [7]). Suppose private grazing sells
for $9.23/AUM (the average for Oregon), while the BLM charges $1.35 per AUM. Then the
beneﬁt from public forage is $5.11 per AUM (= 0.7×$9.23−$1.35) and, using the perpetual
bond formula (bond value = annual payment ÷ r, where is r the annual discount rate), a
5U.S. Department of Agriculture data for 2004 reported by Barry Adam and viewed 1 June 2004 at
www.oregonstatelands.us/rangeland audit response.pdf. The disparity between costs of private forage in
these counties is surprising. Data for Lake County (the county to the immediate west of Harney) were not
available for reasons of conﬁdentiality.
6Same source as in previous note.
7Grazing permits are considered a privilege and not a right. On May 15, 2000, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in a unanimous decision that the appeal by the Public Lands Council et al. in opposition
to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior et al. and the Range Reform Regulations of 1995, has no legal
basis. The Court rejected all the arguments that ranchers on public lands have a vested grazing right. See
w3.trib.com/∼phxcon/supcourtgraz1.html. Politicians have, however, acted as if the permits are a right.
4grazing permit would be worth about $128 per AUM if a discount rate of 4 percent is used
(≈ $5.11/0.04) and $255 if a rate of 2 percent is used.
Ranchers use of public lands has increasingly come under pressure from environmental
groups that see livestock grazing as a contributing factor to the environmental degradation
of public lands, and particularly loss of wildlife habitat. The public land agencies have
reacted primarily by reducing grazing services. In Nevada, for example, AUMs of grazing
have fallen by 32.7 percent (or some 540,000 AUMs) between 1981 and 2002, threatening the
viability of some ranchers dependent upon public forage. To address the external impacts
of livestock grazing on public lands while making reductions in AUMs politically palatable,
Congress has recently begun to consider purchasing ranchers grazing permits. Section 5(a)
of the Voluntary Grazing Permit Buyout Act (Bill HR 3324 IH) introduced into the Congress
on 16 October 2003 (108th Congress, 1st Session), for example, would have compensated
ranchers $175 per AUM, an amount well within the range calculated above.
Sale of grazing permits implies irrevocable loss of access to the public range and, in most
cases, loss of a particular lifestyle. Range economists argue that, because rates of return to
livestock production average no more than 2 percent, grazing permits have value only because
they provide the owner with a quality of life beneﬁt (Bartlett et al. [1]). That is, there is no
evidence that public land ranchers are subsidized and make an inﬂated rate of return because
of low grazing fees (Torell et al., p.6 [24]), so the value of grazing permits is equivalent to
the value placed on the ranching lifestyle. Even if this is true, simple neoclassical theory
indicates that ranchers should be WTP as much to purchase public forage in a world where
available AUMs are declining as they would be WTA to forgo public forage forever — they
should be willing to pay as much to keep the lifestyle as they would be willing to accept to
forgo it.
To investigate the relationship between these welfare measures, we use the 2002 Nevada
5Ranch Survey, which elicited WTA and WTP responses for public grazing. It also included
questions dealing with the ranch operation, community activities, experience with ﬁre, in-
vestments in range improvements, attitudes toward the public land agencies and the future
of public land-based ranching, income, education, and so on. The context of the survey was
the reduction in AUMs of public grazing to protect environmental amenities (noted above).
Ranchers were asked about their WTP for access to public forage and their WTA compensa-
tion for sale of grazing privileges. These questions were embedded in the survey and required
a yes/no response to a proposed bid; the questions are provided in the Appendix. There
were 244 usable surveys after taking into account non-respondents and those who did not
complete some parts of the survey needed for the current analysis. More information on the
survey design, response rates and descriptive variables can be found in Thomsen [23] and
van Kooten et al. [25].
3. Empirical Model
Ranchers are asked both a willingness to pay and a willingness to accept question in the same
survey. As the responses are likely related, we use a systems based approach to estimation,
similar to that used by Poe, Welsh and Champ [20] and Cameron and Quiggin [4]. Our
objective is to test whether there is a divergence between WTA and WTP and to determine
the factors explaining the divergence, if any.
The ith rancher is given randomly determined posted prices for access to grazing rights
on public land. In the ﬁrst instance, the question is structured in terms of willingness to
accept a one time payment per AUM for loss of access to public grazing rights. The posted
price is denoted p1i and the rancher either indicates they accept the price, y1i = 1, or they
reject the price, y1i = 0. The next posted price is structured in terms of willingness to pay
6per AUM for access to public grazing rights.8 The posted price is denoted p2i and the rancher
either indicates they are willing to accept the price, y2i = 1, or they reject the price, y2i = 0.
In addition to the questions concerning willingness to accept and to pay posted oﬀers, the
survey asks a number of questions about ranchers’ individual characteristics; these covariates
are denoted xi.
Notice that the nature of the questions asked mean that the WTP and WTA quesions
are not eliciting immediately comparable information. The WTP is in terms of an annual
payment while the WTA is in terms of a current valued one oﬀ payment. This requires some
adjustment for the diﬀerent time-value, a point we return to below.
To model individual decisions to our survey, we use the random utility framework for
discrete response models discussed in Hanemann [10]. Each rancher i is assumed to have
some true unobservable surplus value νji for each scenario presented in the survey. Here as
above, j = 1 refers to the willingness to accept scenario while j = 2 refers to the willingness
to pay scenario. The surplus in each case is assumed to depend linearly upon a vector of
observable attributes xi, the relevant posted price pji, and a random component ji:
νji = β
0
jxi + γjpji + ji.
The errors are assumed to be jointly standard normal with covariance (equivalently correla-
tion) ρ; further, the errors are independent of xi.9 The covariates are assumed to be common
across both surplus measures though we do allow for diﬀering slope coeﬃcients. To ﬁx ideas,
we expect that as oﬀers to forgo public grazing increase, p1i rises, the surplus to rancher i
will increase, so γ1 > 0. Similarly, as suggested payments for public grazing increase, p2i
8Although not explicit in the survey question (see appendix), the context is clearly that of an annual
payment for one month worth of public forage – a quantity measure.
9The assumption of normality for the error terms allows for straightforward estimation; the common
alternative, the logistic distribution, is not suitable for these purposes, see Cameron and Quiggin [4]. The
unit variance is a simplifying assumption that does not aﬀect our analysis.
7rises, the surplus to rancher i will decrease, so γ2 < 0.
To estimate the model, we proceed as follows. Denote the bivariate standard normal
cumulative density function as Φ2(z1,z2; ρ). Let zji = β0
jxi + γjpji, for j = 1,2. Then the
following describes the possible outcomes associated with our model; consider ﬁrst the case
of both the WTP and WTA oﬀered being accepted by individual i:
Prob(Y1 = 1,Y2 = 1| xi) = Prob(z1i + 1i ≥ 0,z2i + 2i ≥ 0| xi)
= Prob(1i ≤ z1i,2i ≤ z2i| xi)
= Φ2(z1i,z2i; ρ)
where the second last line makes use of the symmetry of the bivariate normal distribution.
By similar reasoning we get the remaining outcomes:
Prob(Y1 = 1,Y2 = 0| xi) = Φ2(z1i,−z2i; ρ)
Prob(Y1 = 0,Y2 = 1| xi) = Φ2(−z1i,z2i; ρ)
Prob(Y1 = 0,Y2 = 0| xi) = Φ2(−z1i,−z2i; ρ)





(y1iy2i)lnΦ2(z1i,z2i; ρ) + (y1i)(1 − y2i)lnΦ2(z1i,−z2i; ρ) +
(1 − y1i)(y2i)lnΦ2(−z1i,z2i; ρ) + (1 − y1i)(1 − y2i)lnΦ2(−z1i,−z2i; ρ)

The model parameters, including ρ, are estimated using standard maximum likelihood meth-
ods, see Greene [9]. We can also test the bivariate model against the simpler set up of two
univariate models by testing the null hypothesis of ρ = 0. Both the univariate models and
the bivariate model provide consistent estimates of the model parameters; however, if ρ 6= 0,
8then the bivariate model is more eﬃcient, see Poe, Welsh and Champ [20]. In what follows,
we report both the univariate and bivariate results as well as a likelihood ratio test of ρ = 0.
With the model estimated, we can calculate measures of willingness to pay and to accept
and investigate what might explain any observed diﬀerences. The linear expression for the
surplus value is consistent with an underlying indirect utility function that is linear in the
dichotomous variable indicating access to public grazing or not, income, and other covariates.
The linear indirect utility function means that the welfare measures of interest are simple
linear functions of the estimated model parameters and covariates, see Hanemann [10].
Let WTAi denote the individual’s willingness to accept and WTPi denote the individual’s
willingness to pay. Then deﬁne ˜ p1i as the expectation, conditional on xi, of the individual’s
willingness to accept and ˜ p2i as the expectation, conditional on xi, of the individual’s willing-
ness to pay. Equivalently in our linear environment these are individual’s median willingness
to accept or to pay; that is, posted oﬀers at which there is a ﬁfty percent probability the
individual rancher will accept the oﬀer. This is easily calculated as the value of pji that sets
the non-random component of the surplus measure to zero:












where the expectation is taken over the marginal distribution of 1i in the ﬁrst equation
and 2i in the second equation. Taking expectations over the sample xi with respect to the













9Estimates of either individual or sample contingent valuations are obtained by substituting
the ML parameter estimates, denoted ˆ γj and ˆ βj. In this study, we focus on the sample
measures.
Estimates of mean WTP and WTA provide information concerning the relationship be-
tween these variables and the covariates used in estimation, which is one area of interest.
We are primarily interested, however, in the diﬀerences between willingness to pay and to
accept and how these might be explained by the covariates. To explore this, we need ﬁrst
to make the the two measures comparable, as one is in terms of a ﬂow (willingness to pay)
while the other is in terms of a stock (willingness to accept). If we assume that all ranchers
have the same discount rate r, then our hypothesis is:
WTP/r = WTA












2¯ x/r = 0
where we now let ¯ x denote the sample estimate: ¯ x = 1
N
P
i xi. This hypothesis can be tested
using a standard Wald test.10
The next issue is to consider what factors, that is which of the attributes xi, systematically
contribute to the divergence between our measures of willingness to pay and to accept. For
10The Wald test we construct is based upon a delta method approximation, which may not be ideal.
An alternative is to use bootstrap methods to estimate the distribution of the individual or across sample
valuation measures, as discussed in Poe, Welsh and Champ [20]. We leave this for future work.
10any individual i we can again write,








































A summary of the posted oﬀers and frequencies of discrete responses is provided in Table
1. Of the 244 usable returned surveys, we consider 194 responses that provide a complete
set of responses to the conditioning variables of interest (these are discussed further below).
As evident from the table, the majority of respondents rejected both the willingness to pay
and the willingness to accept posted oﬀers. Just under ten percent accepted one but not
the other oﬀer and only one percent accepted both. These results suggest that on balance
the survey oﬀers were likely set at too low or too high a level; nonetheless, the results below
suggest there is suﬃcient variation to identify the valuation measures of interest.
The survey asked respondents to provide a wide variety of information beyond their
11willingness to pay or accept the posted oﬀer. Due to the nature of the estimation, however, we
found it necessary to select a relatively small subset of the possible conditioning variables. We
chose those that we thought most likely to have some information concerning the diﬀerences
in welfare measures; these variables are described in Table 2. For purposes of later discussion,
the variables are grouped into (i) ﬁnancial factors, including income, and education, (ii)
lifestyle or quality of life factors, and (iii) attitudes towards environment.
In the ﬁrst grouping, we have income by category, acres owned by the rancher, acres of
public grazing currently used, an indicator of ﬁnancial stress (Likert scale), and education
by category.11 For the second group, we are looking for variables that suggest a strong
attachment to ranching and the local community as indicators of how important the ranching
lifestyle is to the respondent. We conjecture that the greater the attachment the greater any
endowment eﬀect is likely to be. The variables we select for this are whether the rancher
works oﬀ the ranch, whether the rancher intends to bequeath the ranch, and whether they are
participants in community events such as local sports. Finally, the third grouping consists
of an indicator of whether the rancher views grazing as a threat to endangered or threatened
wildlife. As the issue of public grazing rights is closely linked to environmental concerns,
this is a natural direction to explore.
Based on these variables, a typical ranch owner has a 10000 acre ranch using roughly
6000 AUMs of public forage, earns between $60-75000, considers herself to be under ﬁnancial
stress from the livestock business, has attended or completed college, plans to pass the ranch
on to their heir(s), and does not believe that ranching threatens wildlife. Working part time
appears not to be an option, with ranchers either working full time on the ranch or full
time elsewhere. This latter characteristic suggests that just under half of the respondents
are hobby ranchers (that is, 45% of ranchers work full time oﬀ the ranch). Finally, a slight
11Income is from all sources, not just from ranching.
12majority of ranchers do not regularly participate in community events, such as local sporting
events.12
Probit Models
Empirical estimates of general unrestricted bivariate and univariate probit models are pro-
vided in Table 3; Table 4 presents more parsimonious versions of these models. In all cases,
the models have as dependent variables the posted oﬀers (pji, j = 1,2) as well as the co-
variates, or a subset, discussed above. Note that we also include an interaction term for
public grazing and private land ownership to model interdependencies between public and
private land uses. Throughout, we restrict the set of covariates to be the same in both the
willingness to accept and willingness to pay equations.
Some common features are immediately apparent from the two tables. First, in all cases
the posted oﬀers are statistically signiﬁcant and correctly signed: for willingness to accept,
as the oﬀer rises the probability of acceptance increases; for willingness to pay, as the oﬀer
rises the probability of acceptance decreases. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients across the
two welfare measures diﬀers but this is to be expected given that the willingness to accept
question is phrased in terms of a one-oﬀ payment (a large current value number) while the
willingness to pay is phrased in terms of a stream of smaller annual payments.
Second, in almost all instances the remaining covariates are statistically signiﬁcant, if at
all, only in the willingness to accept equations. The one exception is a variable concerning
ranchers’ attitudes toward the local environment. This is somewhat of a puzzle; even if
there are good reasons to expect the two welfare measures to diﬀer it is not obvious that
they should diﬀer in terms of conditioning variables to this extent. As this is not directly
12Details about the exact nature of the survey questions are available from the authors. See also van
Kooten et al. [25].
13relevant to our main focus, we do not pursue this any further leaving it for further research.
Finally, the two estimation methods provide very similar results in terms of what variables
are statistically signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient magnitudes, suggesting that the results and
any conclusions are robust to these diﬀerent strategies. Since the correlation coeﬃcient
between the disturbances is statistically diﬀerent from zero and relatively large, and because
we wish to consider formal hypothesis tests across the two equations, we focus our discussion
on the results of the bivariate probit model. This has the additional advantage of being a
more eﬃcient estimator given that ρ 6= 0.
The general models in Table 3 identify two variables that are statistically insigniﬁcant at
the ten percent level, education and whether the respondent works oﬀ the ranch or not. The
parsimonious models in Table 4 drop these two variables and the bivariate version of this
model is our preferred speciﬁcation. Setting aside for the moment the valuations implicit
in the model, we ﬁst consider the covariates themselves and how they aﬀect the likelihood
of accepting the posted oﬀers. With the exception of the environmental variable, we can
conﬁne the discussion to the willingness to accept equation since the other covariates are
statistically insigniﬁcant in the willingness to pay equation.
Beginning with household income, we see that the higher a rancher’s income category
the less likely they are to accept an oﬀer to forgo public grazing land. As this relates to
income from all sources, it is not possible directly to link this to the success of the ranching
operation.13 One interpretation is that better oﬀ households, through a combination of ranch
and outside income, are best placed to enjoy the beneﬁts of ranching and hence less willing
to give up ranching and the associated use of public grazing.
13Fifty-four respondents indicated that at least one spouse worked oﬀ-farm part time, while in 51 house-
holds one worked full time. For these households, an average 75.6% of income was oﬀ farm. For all ranches,
one-third of income came from oﬀ-farm work. Interestingly, there is essentially zero correlation between
household income and extent of ﬁnancial stress from the livestock business.
14A closely related variable is the extent to which ranchers feel themselves to be under
ﬁnancial stress from the livestock business. The results indicate that the greater the ﬁnancial
stress, the less likely the posted oﬀer is accepted. Plausibly, ranchers under ﬁnancial stress
view the public grazing system as a necessary subsidy to continue ranching and consequently
are unwilling to forgo the subsidy. This requires that the posted oﬀers are not high enough
to compensate for the implicit subsidy, a fact that is indirectly supported by the low number
of oﬀers accepted across the sample (see Table 1).
The scale of the ranch measured by acres owned also enters with a negative coeﬃcient,
indicating that those with larger ranches are less likely to accept an oﬀer to forgo grazing
rights. This suggests that the larger ranches are those more dependent upon public grazing.
An implication from this is that private and public grazing lands are not simple substitutes
but are somewhat complementary: while ranchers with large private holding are better able
to operate without public forage, they also are more likely to have large grazing allotments
(a large number of permits).
We next observe that ranchers with larger public grazing utilization are more likely to
accept a posted oﬀer, all else equal. That is, of two ranchers that are otherwise equal
and oﬀered the same price to forgo entirely public grazing, the one with a greater current
utilization of public grazing land is more likely to accept the oﬀer. This is a somewhat
confusing result; a simple analysis of ranchers’ valuations would suggest that those ranchers
with larger allotments, all else equal, would have a larger surplus and so be less likely to accept
a posted oﬀer.14 We oﬀer the following possible explanations. First, it is possible that public
grazing is not of uniform quality and that large allotments are systematically associated with
lower quality grazing. In this case, it is possible for the surplus value associated with large
allotments to be less than those of small allotments. Of course, this does not explain why
14Recall that the allotment of public grazing is determined by the public land management agencies and
not by the ranchers themselves, so we treat the public grazing allotment as exogenous.
15quantity of public grazing does not have similar implications for willingness to pay. Second, a
rancher with a large allotment may be more willing to accept a buyout because the payment
will be substantial, perhaps making it possible to get out of ranching entirely or to purchase
enough private land so they are no longer dependent on public range. Finally, ranchers may
believe that large allotments of public grazing are unlikely to persist given the pressures from
government and environmental lobbies, while small allotments may be sustainable. In this
case, those with large allotments may be more willing to accept an oﬀer of at least a partial
buyout as they view the loss of these grazing allotments as inevitable.
The cross-product term of public grazing and private land ownership is also positive
and highly statistically signiﬁcant. This indicates that, as the extent of privately-owned
land (allotment of public forage) increases, the eagerness with which a rancher with a larger
public grazing allotment (private holdings) accepts the oﬀer of a buyout also increases. Large
operators appear readier to be bought out, suggesting that, all else equal, lifestyle is more
important than ranching per se. With a signiﬁcant buyout and a large homestead, a rancher
can maintain the ranch lifestyle, living oﬀ their private lands without the concerns about
potentially losing public forage.
The lifestyle factors we consider are two: whether the ranch is intended to be bequeathed
and whether the rancher is an active participant in community events. The former is negative
and strongly signiﬁcant, meaning that those intending to pass the ranch on to their heir(s) are
less likely, all else equal, to accept a posted oﬀer, a result we might expect. The community
event variable, in contrast, is positive and only weakly signiﬁcant (ten percent); clearly, it is
not picking up a commitment to ranch lifestyle as we might expect.
Finally, we consider ranchers attitude regarding the eﬀect of grazing on the local envi-
ronment. Recall the question asks whether endangered wildlife species are unaﬀected by
livestock grazing, with strongly disagree equal to one and strongly agree equal to ﬁve. The
16majority of respondents agreed with this statement, so there is little support from ranchers
for these concerns. The regression results indicate that the less concern a rancher has about
the environmental eﬀect of livestock grazing, the more likely they are to accept the posted
oﬀer and the less likely they are to pay the posted price.
Neither of these results accords with our expectations. Ranchers who do not view grazing
as environmentally costly necessarily have a larger surplus than those ranchers who do view
grazing as costly, as long as the latter are internalizing these environmental costs. The larger
surplus means these ranchers should be less likely to accept a particular oﬀer, all else equal.
Similarly, such ranchers should be more likely to agree to pay a posted price than ranchers
with greater environmental concerns.
We oﬀer several possible explanations. Suppose people’s views on how grazing aﬀects
wildlife depends upon how they use their public grazing allotment, more or less intensively.
Those using it more intensively are more likely to accept that grazing threatens wildlife
than otherwise. Then we might reason that more intensive users of public grazing are those
with greater beneﬁts. As a consequence, less intensive users (those with a high value of the
threaten species variable) have a smaller surplus and are more likely to accept an oﬀer and
less likely to agree to pay a price.
A second possibility is that the result may reﬂect the context of the survey questions,
which motivate reductions in AUMs due to environmental concerns. Those who do not think
livestock grazing has an adverse impact on endangered wildlife species may see no reason to
pay more for the privilege of grazing cattle, and hence may be less likely to agree to a posted
price. Indeed, they may even see livestock grazing as a beneﬁt to wildlife (meaning they
should be subsidized even more than currently). Nonetheless, they would be more likely to
accept a posted oﬀer to sell grazing permits because, if livestock do increase wildlife numbers,
there will be even more pressure in the future to reduce access to public forage as there is
17more competition for habitat and forage between wildlife and livestock.
Finally, the result may reﬂect ranchers’ views of the dependence of the future of public
grazing on environmental concerns. Ranchers with a negative and pessimistic view of envi-
ronmental concerns and issues may be more likely to agree that wildlife are not endangered
by grazing, primarily as a statement against what they perceive to be growing support for
land use policies dominated by environmental concerns. Consequently, these same ranchers
may be pessimistic about the future of public grazing and so more willing to be bought
out now. At the same time, they may be unwilling to pay more because the payment is
considered an environmental payment.
Unfortuantely, it is not possible to discriminate between these and other possible ex-
planations given the data we have from the survey. Our results do suggest, however, that
environmental concerns or attitudes may be inﬂuential in welfare valuation measures of the
sort considered here and that there may well be an element of respondents using surveys for
strategic purposes.
Statistical Tests of the Divergence between welfare measures
As discussed in the previous section, we can use the probit models to estimate valuations
and to test for diﬀerences between the two measures. Table 5 reports mean willingness to
accept and to pay for public grazing. To compare these payments, we consider discount rates
of 2%, 4%, 7%, and 11%.15
15The choice of these discount rates is guided by the following. The real rate of return on investments
by large U.S. companies over the period 1926-1990 was about seven percent, after taxes. Given a corporate
income tax rate of about 35 percent, the pre-tax rate of return is thus about eleven percent. Since individuals
in the U.S. pay up to 50 percent in income taxes, the rate of return to individuals as owners of companies is
closer to four percent, which can then be considered the rate at which people trade oﬀ spending over time.
The U.S. Oﬃce of Management and Budget requires the use of seven percent for valuing costs and beneﬁts
external to the government and 4 percent for internal costs and beneﬁts (Newell and Pizer [19]). Finally,
range economists argue an appropriate rate of return to livestock production is two percent.
18The estimate of mean willingness to accept is $262.65 per AUM while the estimate of
mean willingness to pay is $2.21; both are statistically signiﬁcant. From Table 1, we know
that the values of posted oﬀers to accept range between $5 and $200, below the estimated
mean willingness to accept reported in Table 5, which is consistent with the relatively small
number of oﬀers accepted in the sample. Similarly, the estimate of mean willingness to pay of
$2.21 is low relative to the range of posted payment oﬀers ($1.50 to $20.62), consistent with
the relatively small number of payment oﬀers accepted in the sample. So the model seems
to be doing a reasonable job: the predicted valuations are in line with observed behaviour.
It is of some interest to compare the estimated willingness to pay valuation to the current
fees for permit holders of public grazing allotments. In 2003, the fee charged was $1.35 per
AUM, below but not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from our estimate of $2.21 per AUM
(p-value of 0.282). If we simply focus on the point estimate, then current permit holders
are willing to pay quite a bit more than the current grazing fee. In contrast, our valuation
estimate is well below the $4.90 per AUM that is charged those without permits in Nevada
(BLM [3]).
As discussed in the previous section, it is possible to estimate each individual’s mean
willingness to accept and willingness to pay, − 1
γ1β0
1xi and − 1
γ2β0
2xi. As our ﬁrst indication
of how closely related are the willingness to pay and to accept valuations, we can consider
the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient; this is 0.60 for our sample, higher than that reported by
Borges and Knetsch [2] but below what one would expect if individuals’ WTP valuations are
closely tied to their WTA valuations.
The last part of Table 5 looks at this issue more formally by testing whether the mean
willingness to accept is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the mean willingness to pay measure
adjusted by the discount rates identiﬁed above. For all discount rates considered, the will-
ingness to accept valuation exceeds the adjusted willingness to pay valuation by a large
19amount and, despite the uncertainty surrounding our estimates, the diﬀerences are statis-
tically signiﬁcant. The diﬀerences we observe are consistent with others in the literature.
With a discount rate of four percent, the results suggest that willingness to sell a grazing
permit exceeds willingness to pay for current access to public forage by a factor of about
5 while for a discount rate of eleven percent the ratio is about 13. These are well within
the ‘reasonable’ range of divergence found by Horowitz and McConnell [12] for public and
non-market goods (e.g., hunting permits), health and safety, and even some private goods.
Factors Contributing to the Divergence between WTA and WTP
We now examine divergence in the factors contributing to the diﬀerence between the two
welfare measures in the manner laid out in the previous section. We continue to focus on
the parsimonious bivariate probit model presented in Table 4. The results are presented in
Table 6. The numbers can be interpreted as dollar values with positive numbers making a
positive contribution to the valuation of interest. In the instance of a dichotomous variable
such as the bequest motive, the coeﬃcients have a very simple interpretation: the desire to
pass the ranch on to your heir raises the willingness to accept valuation by nearly $100 per
AUM.
The following variables make statistically signiﬁcant contributions to the diﬀerence be-
tween the two valuations measures; acres owned, public grazing, ﬁnancial stress, and bequest
motive. The other lifestyle factor, participation in community events, and the environmental
variable do not make a statistically signiﬁcant contribution. These conclusions are unchanged
across diﬀerent discount factors.
In the case of acres owned, or size of the ranch, there is a positive contribution to both
the willingness to accept valuation and the willingness to pay valuation, but the eﬀect is
much larger for the former. Previously, we argued the positive contribution to willingness
20to accept might be explained by the dependence of larger ranches on public grazing, so that
the two types of grazing are complementary. This is consistent with the positive eﬀect it
has on willingness to pay as well (though recall this variable is not statistically signiﬁcant
in the probit model itself). Viewed from this perspective, the fact that the eﬀect is larger
for WTA is consistent with the theoretical divergence in the two valuation measures arising
from lack of close substitutes for the good being valued, Hanemann [11]. We can provide a
rough guide to the magnitude of the contribution as well; the mean value for acres owned is
approximately 10, so the contribution to the diﬀerence of $207 (using a 4% discount rate) is
approximately $130, almost half.
Public grazing has the opposite eﬀect, reducing both valuation measures (again, though,
this variable is not statistically signiﬁcant in the WTP probit equation). The relative mag-
nitude of the two eﬀects, however, is such that it brings the two valuation measures closer
together. In general terms, the divergence of the valuation measures for the good (public
grazing) is smaller the greater the allocation of the good. If we interpret the discrepancy as
arising from an endowment eﬀect, this implies that the eﬀect is stronger for smaller quan-
tities of the good (public grazing), a somewhat surprising result. As indicated previously,
however, it may well be that small ranches as opposed to large ones, are all that is needed
to maintain the ‘ranch lifestyle’. If there is suﬃcient oﬀ-ranch income or a large enough
buyout, ranchers appear content to continue on a reduced scale.
Financial stress also makes a signiﬁcant contribution to the discrepancy between the two
valuation measures, raising the willingness to accept and lowering the willingness to pay. Fi-
nancial stress tends to raise the willingness to accept valuation, as discussed previously, while
at the same time reducing the willingness to pay valuation. While the former is somewhat
diﬃcult to explain, the latter would seem to be a straightforward prediction. As a general
conjecture, it seems that the overall ﬁnancial situation, including ﬁnancial constraints, may
21bear on the divergence between the welfare measures. Notably, these sorts of issues are very
unlikely to arise in standard experimental settings examining welfare measures.
Finally, we see a large contribution from the bequest motive. As noted previously, the
desire to pass the ranch on to an heir raises the minimum willingness to accept by nearly
$100; similarly, it lowers the maximum (adjusted) willingness to pay by roughly $50 (for
a discount factor of four percent). If we view the bequest motive as evidence of a long
term commitment to ranching, both as an occupation as well as a lifestyle, then we might
conclude that lifestyle — broadly deﬁned — is important for explaining the discrepancy
between valuations.
5. Conclusions
The relationship between an individual’s maximum willingness to pay and minimum will-
ingness to accept compensation for the same change in a good or service has been the topic
of considerable inquiry. The repeated ﬁndings from numerous survey-based contingent val-
uation ﬁeld studies, which have now been replicated in various experimental and market
settings, is that WTA and WTP diverge, with WTA typically much higher than WTP. The
persistence of such disparities across numerous settings has deﬁed any single explanation,
with researchers having oﬀered a number of competing interpretations. The novelty of this
paper is to evaluate the disparities and examine the contributions from diﬀerent socioeco-
nomic characteristics.
The study uses the results of the 2002 Nevada Ranch Survey, which provides a rich set of
information about rancher characteristics as well as responses concerning willingness to pay
for access to public grazing and willingness to accept payment for permanently giving up
access to public grazing. The joint contingent valuation responses allow us to model the two
22valuations simultaneously using a bivariate probit model; this has the added advantage of
allowing us to pursue inferences regarding the contribution of diﬀerent factors to disparities
in welfare measures.
The principal conclusions are easily summarized and have implications both for public
grazing policies as well as research generally concerned with discrepancies in welfare mea-
sures. First, larger ranches are associated with greater discrepancies in valuations. We
conjecture this may reﬂect the lack of viable substitutes for public grazing lands for larger
ranches. Second, the size of allocation of public grazing is inversely related to the discrep-
ancy in valuations, a result which we ﬁnd surprising and which warrants further investigation.
Third, ﬁnancial stress contributes to the discrepancy; it would seem to be of some interest
as to whether this result is more general. Finally, long term commitment to ranching, either
as an occupation or lifestyle, contributes substantially to the discrepancy.
It is useful to consider these results in terms of land use polices for grazing. Range
economists have always argued that the public land agencies should promote trading of
grazing rights. Where this has been done, however, trades have been remarkably few. One
possible reason for the thin market is the persistence of a diﬀerence between WTA and WTP;
sellers require greater compensation than buyers are willing to pay. Our results provide
support for this explanation of low trading. If successful markets in public grazing rights are
desirable, then our results suggest a number of directions worth exploring. First, it might be
useful to focus attention on markets tailored to smaller ranches where valuations are more
closely aligned. These are likely to be more successful, perhaps providing a starting point
for more general markets to develop. Second, in ways that we do not properly understand,
existing allocations seem to matter. As this factor is under the direct control of the land
use agencies, a better understanding of this result might shed very useful information on
improvements to the public grazing system.
23A further aspect of our results that may bear on land use polices concerns the evidence
of lifestyle factors aﬀecting welfare measures. The results suggest that ranchers with large
public AUMs are more willing to be bought out, retreating to their owned acres. This is
reinforced by our ﬁnding that WTA-WTP divergence is greater for small ranchers. Both
are suggestive of lifestyle (and perhaps an endowment eﬀect). While further investigation is
needed, it does suggest that surplus is not the driving factor, but lifestyle appears to be the
main driver as suggested by ranch economists. If that is the case, the public agencies need
to re-think the issuance of large grazing allotments that also provide large subsidies.
24Appendix
WTA Question: The Grand Canyon Trust has retired 750,000 acres of public land by
providing one-time payments of $75 per AUM to retire grazing leases. Some ranchers have
donated grazing leases in exchange for tax deductions to create parks. Environmental groups
want the federal government to buyout all permit holders on public lands. Would you be
willing to accept a one-time payment of $y per AUM to retire all of your grazing leases?
(Circle) Yes No
WTP Question: According to The Economist (a global news magazine), grazing repre-
sents the last bastion of government-subsidized extraction of commodities from public lands.
Suppose that, as a result of such views and environmental lobbying, the costs of grazing on
public lands will be increased dramatically. Would you be willing to pay $x per AUM to
graze your livestock in the future? (Circle) Yes No
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28Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Posted Prices
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max
p1i Posted price, willingness to pay ($/AUM) $10.37 $4.89 $1.50 $20.62
p2i Posted price, willingness to accept ($/AUM) $91.11 $54.55 $5.00 $200.00
Y1 Discrete response to willingness to pay question 0.11
Y1 = 1, WTP amount posted
Y2 Discrete response to willingness to accept question 0.08
Y2 = 1, WTA amount posted
Joint frequencies of discrete responses:
Y1 = 1 and Y2 = 1 0.02
Y1 = 1 and Y2 = 0 0.09
Y1 = 0 and Y2 = 0 0.83
Y1 = 0 and Y2 = 1 0.07
Total number of observations: 194
SD refers to standard deviation.Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Covariates
Variable and Description Mean SD/Freq
Financial Factors and Education
Income 3.974 [ 0.13, 0.18, 0.11,
0.11, 0.11, 0.36 ]
Categories 1–6, in $, 000s:
[ < 30, 30 − 45, 45 − 60,
60 − 75, 75 − 90, > 90 ]
Acres owned, ’000s, continuous 10.244 32.185
Public Grazing, ’000 AUMs, continuous 5.655 10.336
Under ﬁnancial stress, Likert scale [1, 5 ] 3.990 [ 0.03, 0.08, 0.13, 0.40, 0.36 ]
Education, Categories 1–8: 3.948 [ 0.02, 0.19, 0.36, 0.04,
1=grade school; 0.23, 0.07, 0.05, 0.05 ]
2=high school;
3=some college or technical school;
4=technical training in armed forces;
5=completed college;
6=completed college, some grad. classes;
7=completed Masters degree;
8=completed PhD.
Lifestyle or Quality of Life Factors
Work oﬀ ranch, categories 0–2: 0.907 [ 0.55, 0.00, 0.45 ]
0 = no;
1 = yes: part-time;
2 = yes: full-time.
Plan to pass ranch on to heir 0.897
Indicator: yes = 1; no = 0
Participant in community events 0.479
Indicator: yes = 1; no = 0
Attitude towards Environment
Endangered wildlife are not threatened by grazing 4.036 [ 0.07, 0.07, 0.10, 0.26, 0.49 ]
Likert scale [1, 5 ]
Total number of observations: 194
Notes: Likert scale [1, 5 ] range from 1 to 5 with 1 representing strongly disagree with the statement and 5 representing strongly
agree. Frequency is the proportion of each category in the total of 194 observations.Table 3: Probit Estimation Results for WTP and WTA, General Models
Explanatory Variable Bivariate Model Univariate Model
WTA WTP WTA WTP
Constant -2.369∗∗ 2.974∗∗∗ -2.919∗∗∗ 3.156∗∗∗
1.094 0.997 1.134 1.017
Posted oﬀer (pji) 0.018∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗
0.005 0.060 0.005 0.058
Financial Factors and Education
Income -0.142∗ 0.013 -0.144 0.004
0.085 0.102 0.096 0.099
Acres owned -0.244∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.218∗∗∗ 0.003
0.064 0.005 0.059 0.005
Public Grazing AUMs 0.183∗∗∗ -0.024 0.178∗∗∗ -0.011
0.052 0.034 0.054 0.035
Acres owned × AUMs 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Under ﬁnancial stress -0.408∗∗ -0.112 -0.408∗ -0.137
0.188 0.146 0.218 0.148
Education 0.071 -0.070 0.087 -0.092
0.104 0.077 0.103 0.077
Lifestyle Factors
Work oﬀ ranch -0.050 0.120 -0.067 0.169
0.212 0.177 0.221 0.173
Plan to pass ranch on to heir -1.755∗∗∗ -0.584 -1.737∗∗ -0.682∗
0.672 0.398 0.725 0.409
Participant in community events 0.542∗ -0.365 0.643 -0.450
0.326 0.341 0.358 0.321
Attitudes towards Environment
Endangered wildlife 0.432∗∗ -0.261∗∗ 0.507∗ -0.236∗
are not threatened by grazing 0.194 0.124 0.229 0.124
ρ 0.748∗∗ – –
0.225
Log likelihood -65.625 -29.429 -38.162
Pseudo-R2 0.459 0.467 0.426
Total number of observation is 194. Numbers are point estimates with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors provided in
brackets. A ∗∗∗ denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level; ∗∗ at the 5% level; ∗ at the 10% level for a two-sided t-test
using the standard normal distribution. The psuedo-R2 is from McFadden [18]. See Tables 1 and 2 for variable deﬁnitions.Table 4: Probit Estimation Results for WTP and WTA, Speciﬁc Models
Explanatory Variable Bivariate Model Univariate Model
WTA WTP WTA WTP
Constant -2.125∗∗ 2.619∗∗∗ -2.721∗∗ 2.749∗∗∗
1.001 0.889 1.064 0.903
Posted oﬀer (pji) 0.018∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗
0.005 0.058 0.005 0.059
Financial Factors
Income -0.148∗ 0.026 -0.149∗ 0.024
0.079 0.094 0.087 0.092
Acres owned -0.240∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.210∗∗∗ 0.001
0.069 0.004 0.061 0.004
Public Grazing AUMs 0.192∗∗∗ -0.037 0.186∗∗∗ -0.025
0.048 0.032 0.049 0.036
Acres owned × AUMs 0.002∗∗ 0.000 0.002∗∗ 0.000
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Under ﬁnancial stress -0.408∗∗ -0.085 -0.385∗ -0.109
0.178 0.132 0.207 0.140
Lifestyle Factors
Plan to pass ranch on to heir -1.760∗∗∗ -0.488 -1.693∗∗ -0.583
0.682 0.383 0.726 0.402
Participant in community events 0.535∗ -0.348 0.631∗ -0.431
0.320 0.314 0.346 0.304
Attitudes towards Environment
Endangered wildlife 0.413∗∗ -0.270∗∗ 0.483∗∗ -0.247∗
are not threatened by grazing 0.167 0.125 0.216 0.127
ρ 0.823∗∗ – –
0.200
Log likelihood -66.377 -29.719 -39.043
LR Test (p-value) 0.826 0.415 0.748
Pseudo-R2 0.453 0.462 0.413
As for Table 3. LR Test reports the p-value for the χ2(q) distributed test of the restrictions imposed in these models relative














2¯ x 2.21 1.04 0.033
Tests of Divergence
Discount Rate WTA − WTP/r s.e p-value WTA/(WTP/r)
2% 152.27 61.03 0.013 2.38
4% 207.46 39.40 0.000 4.75
7% 231.11 32.10 0.000 8.32
11% 242.58 29.43 0.000 13.07
Reported standard errors are based on a ﬁrst order approximation of the valuation function conditional on the estimated mean,
¯ x. p-values are for a two-sided test of the null-hypothesis that the valuations or functions of the valuations are statistically
diﬀerent from zero.Table 6: Contributions to Divergence of Valuation Measures
Explanatory Variable WTA (−ˆ β1k/ˆ γ1) WTP (−ˆ β2k/ˆ γ2 × 1/r)
Discount Rate (r)
2% 4% 7% 11%
Financial Factors
Income 8.066 5.009 2.504 1.431 0.911
0.875 0.605 0.361 0.212
Acres owned 13.096 0.204 0.102 0.058 0.037
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Public Grazing AUMs -10.482 -7.013 -3.507 -2.003 -1.275
0.613 0.070 0.002 0.000
Acres owned × AUMs -0.117 0.062 0.031 0.018 0.011
0.011 0.006 0.006 0.007
Under ﬁnancial stress 22.291 -16.400 -8.200 -4.686 -2.982
0.166 0.054 0.015 0.006
Lifestyle Factors
Plan to pass ranch on to heir 96.158 -93.589 -46.794 -26.740 -17.016
0.039 0.012 0.004 0.002
Participant in community events -29.219 -66.817 -33.408 -19.090 -12.148
0.597 0.917 0.725 0.482
Attitudes towards Environment
Endangered wildlife -22.582 -51.871 - 25.935 -14.820 -9.431
are not threatened by grazing 0.288 0.840 0.541 0.240
Numbers in labelled rows are coeﬃcient ratios; numbers below are marginal signiﬁcance levels for the hypothesis test that the
WTA component and the adjusted WTP component are equal; that is, −ˆ β2k/ˆ γ2 = −ˆ β1k/ˆ γ1 × 1/r. Inference is based upon
ﬁrst order approximations.